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ARTICLE
Différance as Temporization and Its Problems
Eddo Evink
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands; Faculty of
Humanities, Open Universiteit
ABSTRACT
Derrida’s philosophy is usually known as a form of critique of metaphysics. This
article, however, argues that Derrida’s deconstructions do not only dismantle
metaphysics from within, but also remain in themselves thoroughly, and pro-
blematically, metaphysical. Its goal is to determine exactly where the metaphy-
sical features of Derrida’s work can be found. The article starts with an analysis
of Derrida’s understanding of metaphysics, as well as its deconstruction, by
explaining the working of différance, mainly focusing on its temporality. Further,
it will demonstrate how in the temporization or deferral of différance
a metaphysical desire for purity remains effective. In readings of several texts,
the mutual interdependence of metaphysics and deconstruction will be
sketched. Then the ethical side of deconstruction will be highlighted, both in
Derrida’s early work as well as in the slightly different elaboration of différance in
the later ethical notions like justice, the gift and the messianic. This results in
a distinction of three versions of différance. Finally, a critical discussion of the
metaphysical side of deconstruction will be followed by a comparison of
different readings of deconstruction and différance.
KEYWORDS Derrida; deconstruction; temporality; metaphysics; différance; justice
Derrida’s work is usually presented as a critique of metaphysics. Although he
refuses any determination of deconstruction, including its equation with
critique (Derrida 1985a) he often underscores the critical scope of decon-
struction (Derrida 1994, 96–117). Whether or not labeled as critique, it is
clear that ‘the deconstruction of metaphysics’, problematizing and disman-
tling a metaphysical way of thinking, is a recurrent and consistent theme in
his entire oeuvre. This article argues that Derrida’s projects of deconstruction
do not only dismantle metaphysics from within, but also remain in them-
selves thoroughly, and problematically, metaphysical. I shall first analyze
Derrida’s understanding of metaphysics, and then how his work decon-
structs metaphysics, by explaining the working of différance, mainly focusing
on its temporality. Further, I shall demonstrate how in the temporization or
deferral of différance a metaphysical desire for purity remains effective. In
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readings of several texts, the mutual interdependence of metaphysics and
deconstruction will be sketched. Then the ethical side of deconstruction will
be highlighted, both in Derrida’s early work as well as in the slightly different
elaboration of différance in the later ethical notions like justice, the gift and
the messianic. This results in three distinct versions of différance. Finally,
a critical discussion of the metaphysical side of deconstruction will be
followed by a comparison of different readings of deconstruction and
différance.
Metaphysics
What is metaphysics, according to Derrida? Although he claims, in his later
work, that he had never described the history of metaphysics as
a homogeneous unity, in his early publications one can find many passages
with quite clear descriptions, portraying metaphysics as a thinking that
determines being as presence. The matrix of the history of metaphysics,
Derrida writes,
. . .is the determination of Being as presence in all senses of this word. It could
be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the
center have always designated an invariable presence – eidos, archè, telos,
energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject) aletheia, transcenden-
tality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth. (Derrida 1978a, 353; cf., 1974,
12)
Metaphysics is a manner of thought that builds systems as constructions of
reality, based on the alleged presence of these fundamental principles.
If such a presence cannot be ascertained within a metaphysical system,
then it needs to be presupposed as a promise of a future fulfilment of
presence. This is the strategy that the young Derrida finds in Husserl’s notion
of horizon. Husserl’s effort to find a justification of scientific knowledge
needs a regulative idea of science, of a linguistic community and of humanity
in general, that must provide the necessary background for an intersubjective
understanding that is also open for new research results and theories. The
receptivity for new theoretical knowledge in fact presupposes a normative
idea of a ‘mature, normal’ mankind that is able to think, read and speak.
Husserl’s idea of horizon functions as such a normative regulative idea, as . . .
. . .a primordial knowledge concerning the totality of possible historical experi-
ences. Horizon is the always-already-there of a future which keeps the inde-
termination of its infinite openness intact. [. . .] It is at once the unity and the
incompletion for [. . .] experience – the anticipated unity in every incomple-
tion. (Derrida 1978b, 117)
This strategy is characteristic for Derrida’s view of metaphysics and even of
philosophy as such. Philosophy tries to control the objects of its analyses and
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its own limits by a unity and totality of presence that includes its own
incompletion. In the opening text of Margins of Philosophy, ‘Tympan’,
Derrida describes philosophy as the attempt ‘ . . . to interiorize every limit
as being and as being its own proper.’ (Derrida 1982, xix) Philosophical
reflection encircles and surrounds its objects, trying to grasp and enclose
them. In the end it does not make much difference ‘ . . . whether it is
a question, finally, of Heidegger’s hermeneutical circle or of Hegel’s onto-
theological circle.’ (Derrida 1982, xx) The interiorizing and encircling move-
ments of philosophy result in the unity and totality of constructions that are
meant to secure the presence of its objects.
The style and rhetoric of ‘Tympan’may suggest that Derrida criticizes this
philosophical strategy as a violent and totalizing movement, that needs to be
interrupted and destroyed by a critical reading strategy. Such a critique,
however, is called naïve (Derrida 1982, xxii). The relation between philoso-
phy and its derangements by deconstruction is in fact more complex.
Derrida does not simply reject metaphysical notions like presence and
logos, because philosophical thought cannot do without them: ‘Of course, it
is not a question of “rejecting” these notions; they are necessary and, at least
at present, nothing is conceivable for us without them.’ (Derrida 1974, 13)
Nor does he try to oppose them with different concepts, since such a strategy
would be easily absorbed by the dialectical and encircling movements of
philosophy. He is looking for an alterity that deranges this encircling move-
ment itself (Derrida 1982, xxiv).
Deconstruction and Différance
Deconstruction performs the disassembling of philosophical constructions.
The principle, foundation or center of these constructions can only appear as
already inscribed in the structures that they were supposed to found, thereby
losing their foundational function and pure presence. Husserl’s ‘Living
Present’, e.g. the self-presence of transcendental consciousness, is inscribed
in the linguistic and temporal traces that it claims to be independent of; these
traces are supplements that are more original than their origin (Derrida
1973; Lawlor 2002, 166–208). Comparably, God can only appear as inscribed
in the history he has created, and is, therefore, mortal (Derrida 1978a,
115–116; Gasché 1994). What was presented as a structure of reality is
unmasked as an inevitably unstable construction. In other words, these
constructed schemes are the results of a metaphysical desire for absolute
presence that can never be accomplished, since every construction and
calculation of this presence will always appear to be in deconstruction.
Deconstruction demonstrates the working of différance, the movement of
references that build a structure of interdependent relations, while at the
same time disordering this same structure. The disordering is caused by
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a spacing of differences that cannot be taken together in one unity of
presence, as well as by a temporization that endlessly defers pure presence,
replacing it by a future that remains to come. The derailing moves of
différance can be traced in texts and in semiotic structures, but also in
worldly structures as they are analyzed in phenomenology. Différance is
thus a strange quasi-concept, combining the tensions of difference and
deferment, spacing and temporization, activity and passivity, verb and
noun, never to be unified in one determinate concept.
In this article I shall focus on différance as temporization, as a movement
of deferment and postponement, in Derrida’s words: ‘ . . . the action of
putting off until later, of taking into account, of taking account of time and
of the forces of an operation that implies an economical calculation, a detour,
a delay, a relay, a reserve, a representation . . . ’ (Derrida 1982, 8). The
working of différance can be detected in language and in semiotic structures.
Their references operate within a system of structures in such a manner that
they destabilize the structures from the start. The temporization of différance
is, on the one hand, the orientation towards an ultimate presence, and, on the
other hand, the inevitable failure to reach this presence, because the reference
to this presence will remain a deferral:
Différer in this sense is to temporize, to take recourse, consciously or uncon-
sciously, in the temporal and temporizing mediation of a detour that suspends
the accomplishment or fulfillment of ‘desire’ or ‘will,’ and equally effects this
suspension in a mode that annuls or tempers its own effect. (Derrida 1982, 8,
my italics)
What is suspended here? The accomplishment or fulfillment of a desire or
will, in such a way that the effect is annulled, that is, in such a way that the
fulfillment will never be reached.
Derrida describes this effect of différance more precisely in a later – and
often quoted – passage in ‘Différance’, that first of all shows how hard it is to
understand and to think this quasi-concept:
How are we to think simultaneously, on the one hand, différance as the
economic detour which, in the element of the same, always aims at coming
back to the pleasure or the presence that have been deferred by (conscious or
unconscious) calculation, and, on the other hand, différance as the relation to
an impossible presence, as expenditure without reserve, as the irreparable loss
of presence, the irreversible usage of energy, that is, as the death instinct, and
as relation to the entirely other that apparently interrupts every economy? It is
evident – and this is the evident itself – that the economical and the non-
economical, the same and the entirely other, etc., cannot be thought together.
(Derrida 1982, 19, translation slightly changed)
This description gives us a double movement, two movements that go
against each other, that need to be thought together but cannot be thought
together as well. The first movement is the surrounding movement of
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philosophy, a calculative detour that promises presence. The second move-
ment interrupts the first one by derailing its movements of detour, by
contaminating its presence and thus by deferring the aimed presence end-
lessly. This results in an irreparable loss of presence, relating its object to an
entirely other. The postponement of différance is thus pictured as the impos-
sible combination of two extremes: postponement as a philosophical regu-
lative idea that tries to guarantee pure presence, and the interruption of this
idea by the ‘tout autre’, which makes presence impossible and the deferral
infinite.
In other passages, différance is discussed in the terminology of transcen-
dental conditions, combining the two competing movements as condition of
possibility and condition of impossibility. Différance is thus a quasi-
transcendental movement of unstable references that makes the aim of
metaphysics both possible and impossible. It is a quasi-transcendental con-
dition of (im)possibility of metaphysics. To be more precise, différance
makes any thinking and any reference possible, but it makes at the same
time the ultimate presence of what is referred to, impossible. What is thus
made impossible, is not truth or meaning, but only absolute truth, absolute
meaning or absolute presence, i.e. eternal truth, a final determination of
meaning and self-sufficient pure presence. As Derrida states himself:
différance, like dehiscence and iterability, ‘ . . . limits what it makes possible,
while rendering its rigor and purity impossible.’ (Derrida 1988, 59; my italics)
Geoffrey Bennington describes this very adequately: ‘We have seen that in
Derrida what makes possible immediately makes impossible the purity of the
phenomenon made possible.’ (Bennington 1993, 277, my italics)
Again, what is suspended by différance? In order to be precise, we need to
distinguish two sides of this suspension. On the one hand, linguistic and
semiotic references do have a meaning and truth that can be found, but they
are always temporary and contextual. The movements of reference do not
halt and cannot be fixed, but can always find new possible outcomes in
different contexts. In other words, meaning is not impossible, but necessarily
contextual and finite. On the other hand, a definite meaning or full presence
can never be found, they are infinitely postponed and made impossible.
What is really suspended, therefore, is the fulfillment of a metaphysical
desire, the accomplishment of absolute presence that the metaphysical way
of thinking tries to establish or claims to be established.
The question that needs to be raised here, is: why is the deferment of
différance a deferment of pure presence? Is this desire for purity a necessary
trait of all references, of all intentionality, of all the movements of différance?
I shall come back to this question several times. First we need to take a closer
look at the relations between metaphysics, différance and deconstruction.
On the one hand, metaphysics presupposes the working of différance, as its
condition of (im)possibility. Derrida sometimes describes the metaphysical
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manner of thought as a reaction to différance, as an effort to dominate and
control its effects (Derrida 1982, xix). This effort, however, cannot but fail,
because metaphysics is always in deconstruction. But différance, in its turn,
cannot be well understood from ametaphysical perspective. It is not an origin, it
is not a concept, it is presupposed in a way that metaphysics cannot grasp
(Derrida 1974, 65).
On the other hand, do deconstruction and différance also presuppose
metaphysics? Deconstructions are processes of dismantling that can only
be understood as at work within metaphysical constructions. They presup-
pose the constructions that they need to deconstruct, otherwise they would
not have anything to dismantle. Doing so, deconstruction demonstrates the
effects of différance. Does différance also presuppose metaphysics as a way of
thinking and writing? At least, différance can only be traced and discussed by
way of its movements and effects in texts and in semiotic and worldly
structures. Since it has no metaphysical presence, it cannot be said to ‘be’.
Therefore Derrida crosses the word ‘is’ to show différance’s non-being
(Derrida 1982, 6). In other words, différance itself, as far as it can be
described as such, can only work and appear in contexts. To put this in
a problematic metaphysical language: différance is essentially contextual, and
therefore it ’is’ not and has no essence. Accordingly, when it is traced in
metaphysical texts, i.e. texts that develop a metaphysical construction of
reality, différance presupposes a metaphysical way of thought and metaphy-
sical language.
But how, then, does différance work in everyday life, in everyday language,
or in other non-metaphysical language, like, e.g. literature? Does différance in
all its occurrences presuppose metaphysics? If it can be traced in all linguistic
and semiotic structures, as well as in the world as a phenomenological
structure of references, then différance cannot be said to necessarily presup-
pose metaphysics, a metaphysical way of thought or metaphysical language.
Différance does its work of spacing and temporizing in all contexts, not only
in metaphysical texts.
This, however, makes the other question that I just mentioned, even more
pressing: why does Derrida describe the deferment of différance as
a deferment of pure presence? Is this orientation to purity inherent in
metaphysics and therefore also an inevitable element of différance as it
works within metaphysics, but not necessarily a trait of différance as such?
Or is it always a necessary trait of différance in all its effects and does
différance always provoke a metaphysical desire of pure presence?
All-or-Nothing-Logic
A detailed discussion of this distinction is given by Derrida in terms of
intentionality, in his answers to questions that were posed to him on the
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occasion of his debate with John Searle. In Limited Inc. Gerald Graff asks if
Derrida does not set up an all or nothing choice between pure self-presence
and the ‘complete freeplay’ of language, taking ideal purity as a goal of
language that will never be fulfilled. ‘Is there not a danger here’, Graff asks,
‘of keeping certain linguistic superstitions alive in order to legitimate the
project of calling them into question?’ (Derrida 1988, 115) Derrida replies
that he does not at all create such an opposition between pure presences and
‘complete freeplay’ – a bad translation of the French jeu – and that he, on the
contrary, emphasizes the inevitable impurity of language. However, his
answer seems to get very close to the position that Graff ascribes to him.
In this discussion it becomes clear again that Derrida does not reject
metaphysics or logocentrism. He underscores the necessity of abstraction
and idealization for systematic scientific and philosophical language. No
conceptualization without the urge for purity. An intention – one of the
issues in his discussion with Searle was the performative language of
a promise – does not necessarily need to be geared towards ideal purity,
but the conceptualization of intentionality, determining the essence of inten-
tions, is indeed directed at purity (Derrida 1988, 128). Concept formation is
both rigorous and pure, or it is nothing at all. Conceptualization is thus
a matter of all or nothing: ‘Every concept that lays claim to any rigor
whatsoever implies the alternative of “all or nothing”. [. . .] It is impossible
or illegitimate to form a philosophical concept outside this logic of all or
nothing.’ (Derrida 1988, 116–117)
In addition, Derrida states that he does not oppose anything to this binary
logic, but adds a complication from within:
To this oppositional logic, which is necessarily, legitimately, a logic of ‘all or
nothing’ and without which the distinction and the limits of a concept would
have no chance, I oppose nothing, [. . .]; rather I add a supplementary compli-
cation that calls for other concepts, for other thoughts beyond the concept
[. . .], another ‘logic’ that accounts for the impossibility of concluding such
a ‘general theory’. (Derrida 1988, 117)
Thus, Derrida does not state an opposition between pure presence and the
play of language, but he does show their inner connection as an inevitable
tension. In fact, he affirms metaphysical desire as part of a necessary binary
‘all-or-nothing-logic’ and then deconstructs it from within. According to
Derrida, this ‘all-or-nothing-logic’ is not kept alive by him, but it is itself
immortal, while at the same time being disrupted from within, and thus
constantly carrying death within it. The immortality of the ‘all-or-nothing-
logic’ is provoked by an ‘indestructible desire or need’, that cannot be
reduced to the language in which it operates. This immortal desire is of
another order, it is of the order of the alterity that continuously brings up
concept formation as well as evades it (Derrida 1988, 116).
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If we compare this text, the ‘Afterword’ in Limited Inc, published in 1988,
to the earlier lecture ‘Différance’, published in 1972, a distinction can be
found in the characterization of metaphysical presence and différance. In
‘Différance’ Derrida mentions the death drive as a variant of the second
movement of différance, the movement that interrupts the calculation of
deferral. In the ‘Afterword’ Derrida relates death to presence: pure presence
would mean pure death. The second movement of interruption therefore
also prevents metaphysics from reaching its own death. Philosophical con-
ceptualization is intent on a completeness that both guides and threatens it,
because, as Derrida writes: ‘Is not the “pure realization of self-presence” itself
also death?’ (Derrida 1988, 116). Therefore, in order for metaphysics to
remain what it is and to function as metaphysics, it needs to be problema-
tized and disassembled by an alterity from within. Due to the facilitating and
disrupting effects of différance, metaphysics continues forever, as immortal,
while failing and dying all the time. It is this tension between conceptualiza-
tion and otherness that Derrida attempts to think with his quasi-concepts of
différance and iterability (Derrida 1988, 129–130).
In short, according to Derrida, he does not create an opposition between
a rigorous metaphysical logic and its impossibility due to the play of lan-
guage, rather he shows their inner connection; nor does he have a choice
with respect to this rigorous logic of ‘all-or-nothing’, because rigorous binary
logic and its deconstruction are inevitable features of all conceptual language.
However, is this ‘all-or-nothing-logic’ really so inevitable as it is presented
by Derrida, or is it a choice after all? Let us first look at a nuance that Derrida
adds here. The desire for purity in this ‘all-or-nothing-logic’ is not necessa-
rily at work in every intention, Derrida writes, but it is part of conceptual
rigor:
It is not accurate therefore to suggest that anyone who uses the word ‘inten-
tionality’ ‘invests intention with the longing for metaphysical plenitude.’ Nor
did I ever say so. Nevertheless, if one wishes to speak rigorously of an inten-
tional structure one should take into account, with or without ‘longing,’ the
telos of plenitude that constitutes it. (Derrida 1988, 121)
But where lies the difference, then, between the intentionality of everyday
language use and rigorous philosophical conceptualization? This distinction
is also elaborated by Derrida in his discussion with Searle. This discussion
concerns, among other issues, the intentionality of speech acts. Common
speech acts, e.g. a promise or the opening of a meeting, are also characterized
by the contextual movements of différance, that function as conditions of
possibility and impossibility, though not in the same way as in concept
formation. Like all language use, the functioning of speech acts is dependent
on its contexts. It is always possible that a promise will be broken. It is always
possible that a phrase like ‘I open this meeting’ is cited in a different context,
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e.g. a joke, a theatre play or as an example in a philosophical article. Such
possibilities are a structural necessity, in the sense that they can never be
completely excluded. Necessarily, then, these possibilities, as possibilities, are
inevitable.
Derrida is not always consistent in his formulations. In the following
quote he describes intentions as structurally uncertain, here in terms of
iterability, in the same formulations as he uses for the uncertainty of scien-
tific and philosophical concepts, as if all intentions never completely reach
their goal of pure presence:
. . .the fact that intention or attention, directed towards something iterable
which in turn determines it as being iterable, will strive or tend in vain to
actualize or fulfill itself, for it cannot, by virtue of its very structure, ever
achieve this goal. In no case will it be fulfilled, actualized, totally present to
its object and to itself. It is divided and deported in advance, by its iterability,
towards others, removed [ecartée] in advance from itself. This re-move makes
its movement possible. Which is another way of saying that if this remove is its
condition of possibility, it is not an eventuality, something that befalls it here
and there, by accident. Intention is a priori (at once) différante: differing and
deferring, in its inception. (Derrida 1988, 56, my italics)
One page further, this passage is clarified in the sense that actualization of an
intention is not impossible, but structurally and necessarily marked by the
possibility of failure:
Once again, to be precise: what is at stake here is an analysis that can account
for structural possibilities. Once it is possible for X to function under certain
conditions (for instance, a mark in the absence or partial absence of intention),
the possibility of a certain non-presence or of a certain non-actuality pertains
to the structure of the functioning under consideration, and pertains to it
necessarily. (Derrida 1988, 57)
In short, in conceptual language the temporalization of différancemeans that
the aim of conceptualization, i.e. full presence, is impossible. In other
language and in other intentions the temporalization of différance means
that the aim of the intention is not per se impossible, but it may be
impossible, meaning that its impossibility is as a structural possibility,
necessarily implied. In his discussion with Searle, Derrida emphasizes that
this structural possibility needs to be taken seriously in the conceptualization
and philosophical understanding of intentionality. Possible failures are not
just exceptions of a general rule or standard that excludes them (this is how
Searle prefers to define the intentions of speech acts), but, due to the
incalculable working of différance, they are a necessary part of the conceptual
analysis of intentions. Both explanations of différance are loosely taken
together in the short passage that I cited above: it ‘ . . . limits what it makes
possible, while rendering its rigor and purity impossible.’ (Derrida 1988, 59,
my italics)
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Again, what is suspended by the temporization of différance? Are the
movements of différance aiming at pure presence, while also interrupting
this orientation? Or are they relating networks of contextuality, necessarily
implying the possibility of loss and absence? And what, in this regard, is
a choice, and what is a necessity? In general, intentions, according to Derrida,
may be fulfilled, but they necessarily run the risk of not being fulfilled. The
intentions of philosophy, however, are driven by an immortal and indes-
tructible desire and need to follow an all-or-nothing-logic, looking for pure
presence. Within philosophy, différance is driven by this immortal desire,
while also invoking the necessary impossibility of pure presence. For
Derrida, there seems to be no choice here, but only necessity (Derrida
1985c, 115–116).
It thus seems that différance and metaphysics are closely intertwined in
Derrida’s work. Philosophy is necessarily metaphysical and différance
deranges its quest for pure presence. This still calls for critical questions:
Can this telos of complete fulfilment and pure presence be justified, instead of
taken for granted? And does Derrida really distinguish between the
différance within philosophy and the différance as it works in other inten-
tions – or is this distinction one that also needs to deconstructed? Before
I answer these questions, let us take a closer look to another aspect of
différance, its normative side, including its effects in ethics and politics.
Ethicity
The temporization of différance has an ethical side as well. This idea is stated
by Derrida in one of his earliest texts, even before he had developed the
terminology of différance. In the opening lines of ‘Violence and
Metaphysics’, Derrida discusses the status of philosophy after the death of
the philosophia perennis, which may perhaps also be called the alleged end of
metaphysics, a situation that is first of all determined by questions, not
questions within philosophy but about philosophy. He calls this situation
a ‘community of the question’ or ‘discipline of the question’, that hides
within it ‘an unbreachable responsibility.’ The questioning of philosophy
has an ethical side, for in the discipline of this community, ‘ . . . an injunction
is announced: the question must be maintained. As a question.’ The first task
for philosophy consists in leaving fundamental questions open. Answers can
only be temporary, pure presence has become impossible. The infinite post-
ponement of answers thus has an ethical side: ‘If this commandment has an
ethical meaning, it is not in that it belongs to the domain of the ethical, but in
that it ultimately authorizes every ethical law in general.’ (Derrida 1978a, 80)
This is what Derrida later calls the domain of ethicity.
The ethical task of philosophy is guarded by différance, because différance
precludes pure presence and definite answers. The openness of philosophy is
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thus guaranteed by différance in movements that are later articulated by
Derrida as invention de l’autre, invention of the other (Derrida 2007). Ethical
laws and rules presuppose this openness, that in itself cannot be grasped by
a concept: ‘There is therefore neither law nor commandment which does not
confirm and enclose – that is, does not dissimulate by presupposing it – the
possibility of the question.’ (Derrida 1978a, 80)
Justice
The ethical side of deconstruction has become more visible in Derrida’s later
work. One of the important texts in this respect is Force of Law (Derrida
1992a), where Derrida discusses the relation between law (droit) and justice.
There is no metaphysical foundation for laws, every actual foundation – e.g.
in a constitution – always has a beginning of historical and political force and
violence. On the one hand, ethics and legal systems need rules, laws and
juridical procedures, although they are never definitive, fixed or above dis-
cussion. The rules and laws aim for justice, but complete justice will never be
reached. The rules and procedures need to be justified themselves, but there
are no ultimate criteria to judge them. The ‘law of the laws’ (la loi des lois) is
that there is no criterion (Derrida 1985b, 94). We have to strive for justice,
but we cannot definitely know what justice is (Derrida 1985b, 107). On the
other hand, therefore, ethics is also more than just following a rule, it needs
the indeterminacy of justice. Laws aim for justice, but justice is infinitely
postponed. Ethical and juridical decisions are thus always characterized by
an aporia between legal systems and incalculable justice:
Law (droit) is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, and it is just
that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calculate with
the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as improb-
able as they are necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments in which the
decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule. (Derrida 1992a,
16)
We aim for justice, but it can never be ensured. There can be no justice
without the experience of an aporia, without the experience of the impos-
sible. There may be a right decision, but, in Derrida’s view, that takes place as
a good application of law, it cannot be called justice.
I think that there is no justice without that experience, however impossible it
may be, of aporia. Justice is an experience of the impossible. A will, a desire,
a demand for justice whose structure wouldn’t be an experience of aporia
would have no chance to be what it is, namely, a call for justice. Every time that
something comes to pass or turns out well, every time that we placidly apply
a good rule to a particular case, to a correctly subsumed example, according to
a determinant judgment, we can be sure that law (droit) may find itself
accounted for, but certainly not justice. (Derrida 1992a, 16)
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Justice can never find the status or situation of presence: ‘There is never
a moment that we can say in the present that a decision is just [. . .], or that
someone is a just man – even less, “I am just”. Instead of “just”, we could say
legal or legitimate . . . ’ (Derrida 1992a, 23). Justice will never be present, it is
the experience of absolute alterity, an impossibility and an aporia, and
therefore unpresentable (Derrida 1992a, 27).
Derrida distinguishes three examples or appearances of this aporia: a just
decision is at the same time regulated and without regulation, it needs to go
through the ideal of the undecidable and it needs to interrupt the delibera-
tion of its rational justification. The last aporia demonstrates that justice is
urgent, it needs to be done here and now, it cannot wait, and therefore it
should not be thought as an horizon of expectation but as interruption of any
expectation. In consequence, justice is infinitely deferred, not as a future
presence, but as what remains to come (Derrida 1992a, 27).
In this manner Derrida discusses justice on the level of ethicity, the quasi-
transcendental conditions of ethics and politics. The aporia’s of ethicity have
strong effects on the level of ethics and politics. According to Derrida, taking
a decision is more than following a rule, that would the calculable carrying
out of a program. A free and responsible decision needs to account for the
rules and procedures as well, which implies going through the undecidiblity
of an aporia. This is a consequence of the ‘law of the law’, that there is no
ultimate criterion to judge or to legitimate laws, rules and procedures. The
justification of such a criterion would be a metaphysical foundation that
necessarily would find itself in deconstruction. A moral decision would
require at the same time the application and interruption of moral laws. As
a consequence, the aporia of a moral decision involves the hubris of an over-
duty (sur-devoir) that transgresses every determinate duty and rule and
makes it impossible to make a just decision (Derrida 1993, 16).
In this approach of ethics, moral responsibility becomes an impossible
and unlimited task. My responsibility for the singular other cannot be framed
in general moral systems, because the other interrupts any general rule or
practice. Moral responsibility and decisions demand rules and their inter-
ruption, demand both ethics and the sacrifice of ethics.
A decision can only come into being in a space that exceeds the calculable
program that would destroy all responsibility by transforming it into
a programmable effect of determinate causes. There can be no moral or
political responsibility without this trial and this passage by way of the
undecidable. (Derrida 1988, 116)
In consequence, moral decisions and moral responsibility withdraw from
any attempt to a theoretical determination (Derrida 1992b, 10, 1993, 20,
1995, 40–41). This in itself already extreme view on moral decisions and
moral responsibility gets even more complicated by Derrida’s conviction that
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‘tout autre est tout autre’, that every other (one) is every (bit) other (Derrida
1995, 77–88). A preference of one other above another other can in no way
be justified, according to Derrida. My responsibility for God, for my neigh-
bor, for my child or for my cat needs to but cannot be sufficiently weighed
against each other. Paradoxically, Derrida’s philosophy of difference seems to
lead him to an indifference between many others. Ethics and morality seem
to be become extremely complicated because of their différantial conditions
of (im)possibility.
Deconstruction, Différance and Justice
In terms of deconstruction, this means that the texts and institutions of law
(droit) can be deconstructed and have to be deconstructed, but justice is
indeterminable and cannot be deconstructed. Derrida even writes that it is
the difference between law and justice that makes deconstruction possible:
(1) The deconstructibility of law (droit) [. . .] makes deconstruction possible.
(2) The undeconstructibility of justice also makes deconstruction possible,
indeed is inseparable from it. (3) The result: deconstruction takes place in
the interval that separates the undeconstructibility of justice from the decon-
structibility of droit. (Derrida 1992a, 15)
Deconstruction thus finds itself between the two poles of law and justice
(Derrida 1992a, 22). Derrida makes things more complicated by writing
several contradictory passages: ‘Deconstruction is justice’ (Derrida 1992a,
15); ‘This kind of justice [. . .] is the very movement of deconstruction at work
in law and the history of law,’ (Derrida 1992a, 25) and ‘Justice is not the same
as deconstruction.’ (Derrida 1997, 27) This can best be understood in such
a way that deconstruction dismantles legal texts and procedures in order to
create space for an uncalculated event of justice. Deconstruction as ‘inven-
tion of the other’ is also an ‘invention of justice’, which means that there can
be no justice without deconstruction, but also that justice can never be
ensured.
We can recognize the structure of différance in this idea of justice,
although it has slightly changed. Ethical rules and juridical laws aim for
justice, justice is infinitely postponed, but it also needs to be thought as an
interruption of this postponement. In the movements of différance, justice –
‘if such a thing exists,’ Derrida adds (Derrida 1992a, 15) – cannot wait, it
needs to be realized here and now, but it also infinitely remains to come.
However, différance cannot adequately be articulated as the condition of
possibility and impossibility of justice. In Derrida’s approach, justice is not
the aim of a metaphysical circular enclosure, it is not a future present, but it
rests entirely on the side of the impossible. Différance makes legitimate
decisions possible, while in its same movements the goal of the legal order
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and its developments, i.e. justice, remains impossible, remains to come.
Justice is only made possible, but will never be actually realized, in the
dismantling and opening of legal systems.
If we ask again, what exactly is suspended in this movement of différance,
then the answer is clear: justice is infinitely postponed. But it also shows that
a change has occurred in the thinking of différance. In Derrida’s early work, it
is the desire for pure presence that is deferred by the referential movements
of différance and interrupted by the completely other. Now in his later work
it is the desire for the tout autre, for the completely other, that is endlessly
deferred and interrupted. Instead of pure presence, it is now pure justice as
an absolute alterity that is the object of desire. The purity of justice is from
the start only described in negative terms: justice can only be thought as
indeterminable, impossible, incalculable and undeconstructible.
The same différantial structure can be found in Derrida’s theme of the
messianic. The promise and call for a better future needs to be kept alive by
deconstruction. Messianic justice is not a future presence but needs to
thought as completely other. The promised and expected Messiah has to
remain completely unpredictable and indeterminable. Derrida wants to
exclude from this expectation any religious or political privilege. He can
only thematize the messianic promise and expectation as an imminence
without a horizon of expectation, therefore as an excavation of existing
traditions, the messianisms. He makes a strict distinction between these
messianisms and the purely formal structure of the messianic that guides
and interrupts them (Derrida 1994, 81–82, 210–212). Moreover, Derrida
claims that this messianic structure is a universal structure of every utterance
(Caputo 1997, 22–23)
This excavation highlights another side of the change in the effects of
différance. In the early work of Derrida the economic circle of metaphysical
philosophy was, on the one hand, problematized as a violent move of
enclosure, while, on the other hand, not naïvely rejected but accepted as
inevitable. In Derrida’s thinking of the messianic this has changed in an
avoidance of any horizon or cyclic gesture: messianic justice must be thought
as a pure alterity, without any determination. For Derrida, the slightest
beginning of a determination is already suspect.
The same goes for Derrida’s texts on the gift. It is necessary to think the
gift and the economic circle together, but also to keep the gift as undeter-
mined as possible, or better, to understand the gift as the impossible: ‘ . . . If
the gift is a name for the impossible, we still think it, we name it, we desire it.
[. . .] One can think, desire, and say only the impossible, according to the
measureless measure of the impossible.’ (Derrida 1991, 29)
In short, justice, the messianic and the gift must be expected and desired,
but must as well remain ‘tout autre’, completely other. In this ethical side of
his work, Derrida seems to have come very close to Levinas (Derrida 1999;
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Critchley 1992). The movements of différance bring about infinite deferral,
suspending pure justice that needs to be prepared for as an unexpected event.
The pure presence of metaphysical desire seems to be replaced by a negative
purity of absolutely indeterminable justice. This somewhat different elabora-
tion of différance in Derrida’s later work raises the same questions that were
mentioned above: why does this suspended justice need to be pure? Is this
a choice or a necessity? Let me relate these questions to a summary of the
three versions of différance that have been discussed above.
Three Versions of Différance
We have found three versions of différance:
(1) Différance related to conceptual reflection in science and philosophy.
Derrida recognizes in this respect a necessary all-or-nothing-logic
reaching for a pure presence. Due to the movements of différance
this pure presence is interrupted, thus made impossible and therefore
infinitely suspended. The temporization of différance is the necessary
infinite disruption and postponement of pure presence.
(2) Différance related to all kinds of intentions that are not per se con-
ceptual. There is no all-or-nothing-logic that looks for pure presence
and thereby would make accomplishment of the intention impossible,
like in the first version of différance. But there necessarily is the
structural possibility of failure and non-fulfilment. The temporization
of différance is the infinite prolonging of its references, since the
intention can always be taken up in a new context.
(3) Différance related to practical and moral intentions and decisions.
These decisions aim at justice, which can only be thought as pure
alterity, and therefore remain indeterminable. The temporization of
différance is the necessary infinite expectation and postponement of
pure otherness.
There is no version of différance that in itself strives for pure presence, but
somehow, in all three versions in a different way, the desire for purity is
presupposed. The first and third version are strongly geared to purity, either
keeping alive the metaphysical urge for pure presence, while deranging it
from within, or infinitely opening up constructions in order to make space
for an alterity, never pure enough.
The second version is a weaker one, not necessarily aiming at purity, but
still described as marked by the necessary possibility of lack of fulfilment. In
fact, this mitigated version is only rarely discussed, in Limited Inc. only in
relation to the stronger all-or-nothing-logic; Derrida also does not always
make a clear distinction between the first and second version. Moreover, the
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consequences and effects of the second version of différance, related to
everyday intentions, are very close to, if not the same as, the effects of the
philosophical hermeneutics of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur: an infinite
line of finite references and interpretations. However, Derrida has always
taken a strong distance from hermeneutics. He fiercely argues for dissemina-
tion instead of polysemy (Derrida 1981, 384–385), stressing difference above
coherence. The weaker version of différance at least needs to be understood
as deranging the alleged metaphysical strategy of the hermeneutic circle that
would enclose and control its object of interpretation (Derrida 1979). This is
not only the case in reading philosophical texts, but also in interpretations of
literature (Derrida 2005). In many of his analyses Derrida draws a distinction
between, on the one hand, a determining and calculating approach, which
stands for the metaphysical style of the enclosing circle, and, on the other
hand, an incalculable and indeterminable interruption of the calculation –
not only in strictly philosophical and conceptual texts, but also in the
contexts of ethics, politics and literature. This sharp difference between
calculation and the incalculable is what unites the first and third version.
In short, Derrida’s texts demonstrate a great inclination to favor the strong
versions of différance, while also the weaker version still seems to be remi-
niscent of the tension between impossibility and purity.
The Problems of the Desire for Purity in Différance
After this analysis of différance, the question emerges again: why is the
temporization of différance a suspension of purity? According to Derrida,
conceptual analysis is necessarily part of an all-or-nothing-logic that aims for
pure clarity. This is supposed not to be a matter of choice but of necessity.
However, that is not as self-evident as it is presented by Derrida.
Scientific and philosophical reflections are performed on several levels of
abstraction and generality. It is true that general distinctions on a scientific
theoretical level presuppose a larger metaphysical framework, but that does
not mean that all conceptual distinctions need to be forced, through con-
structions of oppositions, into the extreme dilemma of either pure presence
or impossibility. All kinds of systems, hypotheses and procedures can be
practically useful without claiming to be absolutely true and self-evident. It is
very well possible to make a choice to discuss matters on a metaphysical level
or on a different level, like scientific research, applied ethics or theoretical
interpretation in the humanities, to name just a few examples. It is also
possible to relate such reflections to a more profound metaphysical level, but
that is not necessary. Of course Derrida was aware of such a distinction, but
the logic of différance clearly seems to overlook it.
And even if one chooses to discuss things with respect to their first
principles and presuppositions, on a metaphysical level, then still an all-or-
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nothing logic is not evident at all. Contrary to what Derrida states, not all
philosophy can be said to attempt to conquer and enclose its objects, ‘ . . . to
interiorize every limit as being and as being its own proper.’ (Derrida 1982,
xix) In the hermeneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur the contextuality of texts
and appearances shows them to be limited by horizons, but not in such a way
that these limits are taken as beings or as proper elements of a conceptual
system. Here we find a crucial difference between Hegelian dialectics and the
hermeneutical circle – and in this respect Derrida seems to be more Hegelian
and more metaphysical than Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur.
The contextual embedding of all understanding makes pure presence
impossible. There will always be the possibility of a new reference, a new
meaning, a new nuance. But by sticking to an all-or-nothing-logic, Derrida
keeps the metaphysical desire for pure presence alive, while deconstructing
all its appearances as contextual, thus taking the openness of new references
for a suspension of ultimate full presence. However, the contexts and hor-
izons of understanding are not our own projections, they are given to us as
historical, social and cultural constellations that no one can survey or con-
trol. We can try to understand and conceptualize them in theories and
worldviews, but these views are themselves contextually embedded as well;
they are hypotheses that do not necessarily claim pure presence, that do not
interiorize their own limit as a being. Perhaps hermeneutics can offer a more
radical critique of the metaphysical tradition than Derrida’s deconstruction.
A binary all-or-nothing-logic is not necessary, following it to the bitter
end is a choice. Derrida makes this choice, though often implicitly. As
a consequence, he relates the movements of différance to a pure presence,
and in his later work to a pure alterity. In deconstructions of explicitly
metaphysical constructions, this strategy is powerful and successful,
a welcome strategy of interpretation. In Derrida’s quasi-transcendental ana-
lysis of the conditions of (im)possibility of ethics and politics, however,
deconstruction and différance often are counterproductive, leading the oppo-
site effects of what they seem to desire. By underscoring the absolute inde-
terminacy of justice, Derrida makes every effort to understand and determine
justice impossible. Due to the requirement of purity and thus absolute
indeterminability, every effort to make a distinction between justice and
injustice becomes suspect. The paradoxical result is that, in being impure,
all attempts to make such a distinction, become indifferent. Indifference is
thus the undesirable effect of Derrida’s deconstruction of law and ethics
(Evink 2009, 2019).
Fortunately, a different reading of deconstruction and différance is
possible. That is the weaker version of différance, stressing the inevitable
contextuality of all utterances and all phenomena, without the metaphysi-
cal urge for purity. In this reading, différance still manifests how radically
provisional and temporary all ideas, views and appearances are. It is still
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possible to ask for metaphysical foundations, but all metaphysical con-
structions are contextual and temporal because of their embedding in
historical and cultural horizons. These horizons themselves are also
impossible to determine or define for once and for all. It is also possible
to make useful and convincing distinctions in the search for truth and
justice. They do not by definition get stuck in an aporia between pure
presence or pure otherness on the one hand, and calculation or determi-
nation on the other.
The most important and valuable aspects of différance can all be found in
the weaker version. In the stronger version a metaphysical desire for purity is
still at work that, through a binary logic of ‘all-or-nothing’ gets stuck in
a dilemma between absolute purity and determining calculation, which in
the end runs the severe risk of making everything indifferent. These pro-
blems can be avoided if we choose for the weaker version of différance and
deconstruction.
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